This autumn experts are developing alternative climate scenarios as part of a foresight project that helps prepare the 2nd Strategic Plan 2024-2027 of the Horizon Europe Framework Programme for R&I. The project is conducted by the “Foresight on Demand” Consortium on behalf of the European Commission, DG RTD. In a Deep Dive area “Climate change and R&I: from social change to geoengineering”, Prof. Benjamin Sovacool, together with the other members of the expert team, are developing, among others, this 'technological fix' scenario. Get involved, comment on the scenario and relate the scenario to recent developments! Scenario dimensions Strong global governance; Sustainable lifestyles; Open to risk-taking; Weak activism Impacts and risk areas[1] Although Europe has banded together via the European Commission as well as coordination involving coalitions of individual countries, climate change continues to ravage the continent in 2040 as global warming has reached 2oC above pre-industrial levels. Storm surge and flooding have inundated large parts of the Netherlands and other low-lying parts of Western Europe, and the Arctic parts of Russia, Norway, Finland, and Sweden continually see numerous glacial lake outburst floods and the advanced melting of permafrost, some of which have incurred billions of dollars of damages, such as the famous 2029 avalanche and resulting flood that decimated large parts of Rundvassbreen, an outlet glacier of Blåmannsisen and one from Flatbreen, an outlet glacier of Jostedalsbreen, and the permanent closure of the Trans-Siberian railway. Severe drought has also affected crops severely with Greek olive farmers, French winemakers, and Spanish vegetable growers all seeing record high rates of crop losses, fires, and unemployment. Heat waves continue to constrain nuclear power generation in France and curtail hydroelectricity generation in Norway, Eastern Europe, and Iceland, due to unexpected melting of snowpack and seasonal alterations in river flow and precipitation patterns. For the first time ever, London faced a sever water shortage in 2039 due to unusually warm temperatures and the complete draining of the Thames River, which ran dry for four months. European leaders plan to meet in 2040 to discuss a “Common Treaty for Climate Refugees,” estimated to surpass 100 million in 2035. The European Fuel Poverty Observatory also estimates than 40% of households across the continent are either in severe or chronic energy poverty. Practices and technologies[2] Europe remains a hub of hopeful innovation and technical fixes to these challenges, with scores of notable inventions patented and commercialized over the past two decades. French biologist Jean-Luc Picard famously developed his drought resistant treatment for agricultural production in 2031, one that entered into widespread use within the sector by 2035. Artificial meat and advancements in other cultured products have buttressed large changes in diet, with 40% of Western Europe now self-identifying as either vegetarian or vegan. Six of Europe’s largest offshore wind farms as well as seventeen nuclear power plants (expected to retire in the 2020s) were instead given license extensions and now power the four largest desalination facilities in the world, supplying water to one-third of continental Europe and (via a transboundary sharing agreement) Israel. The European Space Agency also committed €1 trillion to deploy an Interplanetary Sun Shield at the LaGrange Point between the Earth and Sun, with construction already occurring in high orbit and completion of a moon colony (which will provide materials, robotics, and resources for the Shield) expected to occur by 2042. The Sun Shield is competing with an American proposal to deploy a Dyson Dot also at the same La Grange point, with construction commencing in 2044. In the Mediterranean, localized deployment of cloud brightening and coastal afforestation have begun to regenerate and restore degraded seascapes and marine areas. Hydrogen has achieved widespread use within industry, and 98% of Europe’s passenger car fleet is now fully battery electric. Marine permaculture, especially seaweed farming, is widespread off the coast of Scotland, Ireland, Iceland and Greenland. Demographics, economy and governance[3] Europe remains a global leader in climate governance, surpassing the United States in 2028 as President of the World Bank and becoming the premier negotiator for climate mitigation thereafter. The landmark 2031 Treaty between the EU-China pledges to cut emissions by 90% by 2040, well before China’s Five-Year Plan had initially promised. In return, Europe now has 250 million Chinese migrants who work on green technology and clean industrial systems, notably solar energy, hydrogen, and batteries. Populations in Europe have therefore begun to rise, due to the influx of immigrants and positive spillover effects of innovation. Crowdsourcing business models have begun to flourish as well, especially among peer-to-peer networks and cooperatives, such as the newly formed Mondragon Energy Cooperative in 2039, which now controls 24% of European electricity supply across seven countries. Innovations have not diffused equally, however, with many youths and students, those having to rent rather than own their homes, and elderly still reliant on fossil fuels or in substandard housing. Life-styles and activism[4] Given the severity of highly visible impacts and risk areas, climate change has become a defining local, national, and regional political issue.The Green Party is now the largest single political coalition across Western Europe, following national victories in German, Denmark, and the UK (following a disastrous 20 years of Conservative leadership). Their “Green Vision for Europe” has wide appeal across all constituencies.The election of Prime Minister Greta Thunberg to preside over the European Commission has launched a new wave of youth climate activists, including the very influential “Net Zero Now!” organization which has more youth subscribers than the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts combined.The 2037 Carbon Divestment Act, implemented as EC.1031.121, also restricts any financial institution from investing in fossil fuels, an act that resulted in the stranding of more than $110 trillion in fossil fuel assets around the world. [1] https://www.climatechangepost.com/netherlands/coastal-floods/ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252101036_Glacier_Lake_Outburst_Floods_in_Norway_2001_-_2009 https://edition.cnn.com/videos/weather/2022/08/17/historic-drought-dries-europe-rivers-orig-aw.cnn https://21stcenturychallenges.org/the-thames-barrier/#:~:text=The%20barrier%20was%20originally%20designed,on%20protecting%20London%20from%20flooding https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-and-consumers/energy-consumer-rights/energy-poverty_en#:~:text=guarantee%20our%20health.-,Energy%20poverty%20in%20the%20EU,the%20EU%20and%20its%20members [2] https://www.newstatesman.com/environment/food-farming/2022/06/world-drought-europes-farmers-heatwaves-climate https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/europe-over-20-now-flexitarian-number-of-vegans-doubles-according-to-new-study/#:~:text=1.,representing%203.2%25%20of%20the%20population. https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine/quenching-worlds-thirst-grid-water-desalination#:~:text=Once%20only%20an%20issue%20in,connection%20to%20the%20electricity%20grid. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032122001046 https://www.sams.ac.uk/facilities/seaweed-farms/ [3] https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news-your-voice/news/joint-press-communique-following-second-eu-china-high-level-environment-and-climate-dialogue-2021-10-10_en#:~:text=In%20a%20high%2Dlevel%20meeting,between%20China%20and%20the%20EU. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8730528 https://www.energy-storage.news/the-three-things-the-us-needs-to-catch-up-with-europes-battery-gigafactory-charge/ https://www.mondragon-corporation.com/en/about-us/ [4] https://policy.greenparty.org.uk/eu.html https://www.unicef.org/stories/young-climate-activists-demand-action-inspire-hope https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/socialpolicy/2019/10/28/the-greta-generation-the-rise-of-youth-activism-for-climate-change/ https://gofossilfree.org/europe/ https://unfccc.int/news/divestment-movement-takes-step-forward-in-eu

FUTURE-PRO: Megatrends and Grand societal challenges A proposal for a methodology to identify Megatrends and Grand societal challenges with a significance for Research and Innovation in the Czech Republic In 2021, we designed and implemented a methodology for identifying Megatrends and Grand societal challenges with a significance for the Czech Republic. This work was carried out via a research grant from the Technology Agency of the Czech Republic (TA ČR). The final users included the Government Office of the Czech Republic with the aim to update Research and Innovation priorities in applied research as well as the Ministry of Industry and Trade, who is responsible for implementing the Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS3). The foresight process combined desk-research, workshops and a Delphi survey to select and prioritise relevant Megatrends and Grand societal challenges. In the first phase of the project, a desk-research was carried on stocktaking information from foresight reports produced by various authoritative organisations. These included international organisations (e.g. EU, OECD, NATO), national reports (e.g. Finnish Government report on the Future, USA Global Trends Report), businesses (e.g. consultancy companies, insurances) and non-profit organisations (e.g. Oxfam, The Millennium Project). See the final report for the whole list of sources used. These insights about Megatrends and related societal challenges were summarised into 18 cards covering a broad spectrum of topics along the STEEP framework: Each card was then reviewed and discussed by a large panel of domain experts during a World café workshop as well as through individual consultations. Approximately 100 experts participated in these consultations. The final version of the 18 cards was then distributed to 25 Delphi participants, who assessed their relevance for Research and Innovation priorities in the Czech Republic based on three criteria: "The area will have a very significant impact on the quality of life in Czechia in the next decades." "Public funding should be preferentially allocated to understanding it and addressing it." "Czech Republic should preferentially allocate public funding for this area compared to the other areas to support research, development and innovation in social sciences, humanities and arts." In addition, experts were tasked to reflect on the most significant societal challenges that stem from the implications of Megatrends. To provide further information to the Delphi experts, we conducted two public consultations. One in the form of a forecasting tournament, where participants were tasked with forecasting the results of the Delphi survey. The second via a one-off questionnaire to young researchers participating in the Zeta program of the Technology Agency of the Czech Republic. The results of the Delphi survey clearly outline a cluster of significant areas that should be prioritised in Research and Innovation policy. These include Education and Employment, Digitisation, AI and automation, Environment, Democracy and Governance, Science and Innovation, Values, Poverty and Inequalities and Health. See the graph below for the full results of the Delphi survey. The whole study in English can be found on this web address: https://www.vyzkum.cz/FrontClanek.aspx?idsekce=962481 If you have any questions, feel free to contact Alexandre Reznikow at alex@ceskepriority.cz

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Hydrogen is „just“ an elementary molecule consisting of two hydrogen-atoms. Why is there so much fuss about this simple molecule that even a whole economy should or could be built upon it? The reaction of hydrogen (H2) with oxygen releases a lot of energy while forming pure water. In the other direction, water can be divided into hydrogen (H2) and oxygen with the help of electricity (there are of cause also other hydrogen building reactions mostly built on fossil fuels/biomass); this is simple chemistry. Compared to fossil fuels, water is nearly unlimited on the planet. Hydrogen is a lightweight gas, and depending on pressure, surface or chemical binding, it can be transported, serves as a fuel and can be used for mobility, heating, chemical reactions or the generation of electricity (storage). We would have an abundant fuel based on the (theoretical) abundance of water and electricity produced by renewable energy facilities. There is no peak oil and no GHG-Emissions – only pure water and energy. This can be a game changer – assuming we get the technologies right. But let’s assume this will be the case. And how will the game be changed? This is precisely what we are going to explore in our Scenario-Exercise. The key question is: How could a world (Europe) look like with abundant energy in the form of hydrogen? What are the central factors shaping the future, given that we have abundant (green) hydrogen? We will have to look at global developments and the situation in the global south. For example, in Northern Africa, there is enormous potential for renewable energy – only that fresh water might be a problem. However, what if technology allows for electrolysers that can cope with seawater? And what happens to countries only with limited access to freshwater or seawater? Would that create new imbalances and potentially new lines of conflict? What about the interest of the nations in the global south? The term “new colonisation” has already been born. In addition, what happens to global power relations? What influence will the current conflict with Russia have in the future, and what are the new constellations after this war? Building renewable energy facilities requires a lot of – partly critical – raw materials. Will Europe be in the position to have access to all required raw materials? Will the oil-producing countries just wait and see? Will they transform and also become hydrogen or electricity producer? Maybe Arabian countries enter the road to synthetic fuels and can just use existing infrastructure. How will large multinational companies position themselves? A closer look into Europe might cover topics like, how self-sufficient/autonomous Europe can be. Will the population accept all the renewable energy facilities? Do national and European legislation and administration allow such a fast transition? Can such a transition be just for all? Which impact will the transition towards a circular economy have on energy demand and the structure of industrial production? Which role can digitalisation play – concerning smart grids in connection with cybercrime, resilience and terms of preparedness? Most of these questions relate to so-called influencing factors that will help us to ask the right questions for the future. These factors help us define and explore scenarios of a Hydrogen Economy in Europe. We will systematise the process of the identification and selection of key factors and build projections into the future of each of these key factors. Consistent and plausible combinations of the projections will build the skeleton for our scenarios. These will be enriched, assessed and evaluated. The overarching guiding question for our assessments will be, in the end, what can and must Research and Innovation Policy do to support the transition best? We will regularly update news about the scenario process on this platform. The scenario workshops will take place online: 8. September, 13:00 – 16:00 CEST: Selection of the key factors 14. September 9:00 – 12:00 CEST: Building of the projections 26. September 13:00 – 16:00 CEST: Selection of the scenarios and first enrichment If you are interested in joining the workshop and contributing to the discussions with the expert group, please send a private message via LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ullrichlorenz/overlay/contact-info/, and we will provide you with the dial-in details. Looking forward to the exploration of the future together with you.

Making use of the four “Imaginaries for a Sustainable Europe[1] in 2050”presented by the European Environment Agency and the Eionet[2] Sustainability The European Green Deal is the flagship initiative of the European Commission to turn Europe into a climate-neutral continent and foster the transition towards a modern and resource-efficient economy. Four areas with ambitious goals have been defined in the strategy: becoming climate-neutral; protecting human life, as well as flora and fauna by cutting pollution; helping companies become world leaders in developing clean products and technologies, and helping to ensure a just and inclusive transition. Nobody could really question these broad goals. Nonetheless, it is likely that most people have different associations and inner images when thinking about e.g. climate neutrality, and it is important to seek to clarify what is behind such broad concepts. Such debates and orientations about sustainability are not new at all. The beginning of the exploration, of what sustainability is, or better said should be, goes back to the late 1980s: from the Brundtland Commission in 1987 and later in 1992 with the Rio conference, sustainability rests on three pillars: a social, environmental and an economic pillar. This very first conceptualisation was, on the one hand, a breakthrough in the global political arena but was later mainly criticised for the missing mutual interactions and the integration of the three pillars. The critique is not entirely fair. The pillars have always been coupled, but often one was given a stronger focus. It was even used to promote the economic paradigm of growth to be in the position to finance social systems and environmental protection. Without going into details at that stage, this decoupled debate was mainly possible by the missing internalisation of external (environmental) costs. Nonetheless, it was the first time that on a global political agenda, it was acknowledged that the immense production and consumption creating waste and pollution and social imbalances globally could not be a model for the future. One of the most recent conceptualisations by the United Nations uses seventeen sustainability goals (SDG), including economic development, resource efficiency and environmental goals, amongst others. Since adopting these goals, many initiatives have been put in place across the world. However, the goals, especially on a more concrete level, can be conflicting and are partially contradicting each other. For example, SDG 9 promotes industrial production, which might conflict with decreased resource use (SDG 12) and pollution (SDG 15). Depending on how such developments are shaped, also equity and justice are not guaranteed as still, profitability dominates the economic discourse. Such issues are commonly resolved by the argument that priorities are different in different regions of the world and that the concept, therefore, needs to be adapted to regional specificities. Furthermore, even when goals are reached, that does not automatically imply that different countries have taken the same measures and pathways towards the same goal. All in all, even with more details on what is meant by “sustainability”, still further clarification can help. The concept can be seen as a plain field to freely manoeuvre: sustainability is the vision, and the planetary boundaries define the corridor in which it can be reached based on different values, cultural heritage and available resources. The Green Deal is an attempt to further shape sustainability for Europe. But it goes without saying that the goals and ideas are still broad and can be realised completely differently in different regions of Europe. There are twenty-four official languages in Europe and twenty-seven member countries with different cultures and values. Some countries have coastlines, others have no access to the sea at all. Also, population density varies significantly across the different countries. Some countries have a focus on industrial production, others on agricultural production or on IT services. Sustainable solutions must differ across the different European regions. Here the scenarios/imaginaries co-created by the European Environment Agency (EEA) and its country network Eionet kick in as a useful tool to further explore what concrete alternative options for shaping sustainability are. Scenario-management Whenever it comes to “thinking in different options”, it is a good starting point to think in scenarios. The term “scenario” originates from the theatre world and literally means the description of the set-up of the stage for a specific scene. The relation to the theatre is useful: the same scene in the same play might look completely different, depending on the art director, the tradition of the theatre, the city and the expected audience. In all cases, one can describe the stage and all items needed for the play. The same applies to the scenarios: the play is “sustainability”, and the items are the different areas that strongly impact it and are highly uncertain. In the terminology of scenario management, these items are the key factors or dimensions. The specific variant of the “item” is called projection. Certainly, there are different techniques for systematically thinking about the future and setting up scenarios. One of these approaches is called “Scenario Management” or “Scenario-Technique” where in the core, a set of relevant key factors is identified, and for each key factor, different (3-5) projections are constructed. These key factors form, together with the projections, a morphological box. A consistent combination of one projection per key factor forms the skeleton for one scenario. This kind of scenario management technique has been applied in the project “Scenarios for a sustainable Europe in 2050” by the EEA and the Eionet. Based on the normative concept of sustainability – as framed in the Green Deal – a set of influencing factors was first collected in a participatory process along with the STEEP categories (Social, Technological, Environmental, Economical and Political). Factors like “values, lifestyles, attitudes towards sustainability”, “Production and consumption of energy”, “Role of technology”, or “Pattern of European cooperation” have been selected, next to others. These key factors define the skeleton of the narrative of how sustainability can be shaped in Europe. The four imaginaries of the European Environment Agency and the Eionet The four imaginaries are called: “Technocracy for the common good”, “Ecotopia”, “The great decoupling”, and “Unity in adversity. The detailed descriptions of the imaginaries can be found on the webpage of the EEA: https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/scenarios-for-a-sustainable-europe-2050/the-scenarios All scenarios carry elements that are visible already today. In addition, these scenarios are normative in the sense that only sustainable solutions are covered in the key factors and projections. The bandwidth of different developments in the scenarios is not that wide or extreme. It is striking that these imaginaries also represent different current discourses in Europe, which makes this kind of assessment especially rich. The imaginary “Technocracy for the common good” advocates technological innovation as the key solution to a sustainable development in Europe. In contrast, “Ecotopia” promotes a “back to nature and communitarian” solution. The imaginary “The great decoupling” focuses on a neo-liberal path toward solving all challenges economically, while the imaginary “Unity in adversity” suggests a strong top-down EU policy as the central key to sustainability. Apparently, tensions and possibly conflicting objectives between the different solutions and certain protagonists lead the public debate. The imaginaries do not resolve the conflicting goals but allow to make these different discourses visible and accessible for an informed political debate. How could R&I make use of such kinds of scenarios or imaginaries? Should all discourses be supported or followed by in the research programmes? Who are the prominent actors in the field having an interest in one or the other solution? Which role does the subsidiary principle play? How much freedom and independence are needed for shaping sustainability effectively in the different regions of Europe? How must this be reflected in the Research Programmes? Imagine us starting to cross-link the discourses to some domains in R&I. For example, how would R&I be shaped within the different discourses? This table is not a completed research project but illustrates in simple a way how a different discourse might shape the orientation of the research agenda. In such a sense, the imaginaries of the EEA and the Eionet are useful tools to support the political exchange and reconsider R&I policy. We can assume that there are different solutions to a sustainable Europe. Which is (where?) the most effective? How fast do we need to transform? What are the most urgent topics and issues to resolve? Is transformation always the solution to the problems? Shall we be prepared for the less attractive transformations? And how? Scenarios like those from the EEA and the Eionet do not deliver all the answers. But they help to concretise abstract concepts like “Sustainability”. And such scenarios help to facilitate a debate about what we as a society want. Interestingly, current discourses are all well reflected in such scenarios, and while the tone of the protagonists of the discourses might be harsh on social media, with the help of such scenarios, the options and viewpoints can stand next to each other, and the discussions get a different characteristic. How would YOU like to shape sustainability for and in Europe? And what are the most important research topics? Let's exchange on the future of Europe. ------------- [1] Europe stands for the 27 countries being in the European Union. [2] The European Environment Information and Observation Network (Eionet) is a partnership network of the European Environment Agency and its 38 member and cooperating countries.

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The concept of the global commons refers to resource domains that fall outside national jurisdiction, to which all have access, including high seas, airspace, outer space and cyberspace. Given the growing significance of these domains and related resources for states and other global and local players across a range of purposes, defining the global commons concept has become more complex. A range of challenges need to be addressed in relation to global commons: - Access to most of the global commons is difficult. S&T advances and increased demand for resources is leading to increased economic and scientific research activity. As a result our planet is facing critical environmental challenges, most importantly climate change and global warming, the depletion of the Ozone layer, and rapid environmental degradation in the Antarctica. If business as usual prevails, these trends will likely worsen and will negatively impact the global commons’ capacity to provide ecosystem services for human well-being. (UN). - The danger is not just of degrading the environment, but of breaching crucial biospheric limits. Resource users need well-defined boundaries (to date 5 of 9 boundaries have been breached : climate, biodiversity, biogeochemical flows (fertilizer use), deforestation and freshwater) - The Global Commons Stewardship Index results suggest that almost all countries and regions are unlikely to achieve the 2030/2050 goals and that drastic socioeconomic system transformation is urgently needed. - To stay within the planetary boundaries, a radical transformation of key economic systems will be required to significantly reduce their environmental footprint. Four systems are of particular importance: the food system, the energy system, the urban system, and the global production/consumption system. Incremental progress will not be enough. Only with disruptive, systems-level change can we hope to get on the right path. Our focus should be a complete overhaul of key economic systems and development pathways. Transition management theories. - Managing the global commons - many gaps and challenges remain since the frameworks covering the global commons are complex and fractured. Their management involves increasingly complex processes to accommodate and integrate the interests and responsibilities of states, international organisations and a host of non-state actors. Drivers and Barriers Changes in the related foresight drivers may influence the global commons in different ways, for example, in terms of perceptions and behaviour in relation to the resource domains. Technological change may make resource domains more accessible, geopolitical change may affect previously agreed regimes of governance, values may change with specific generational concerns, while ecological and economic change has meant that as land resources are depleted, deep sea minerals have gained in importance. A key driver for the global commons is the emergence of global societal challenges, including climate change, polluted atmosphere and oceans and biodiversity loss. Widespread awareness of how these challenges are connected to unregulated, exploitative behaviour, with repercussions for social equity, quality of life and well-being, fuels the demand for climate justice. Indeed, a key driver is the view that markets can be very unfair and destructive, unless they exist within a frame of governance that ensures fairness in the community. Increased citizen discontent is becoming more evident, particularly in the use of social media to shame exploitative market behaviour and through consumer activism, boycotting brands with unethical production processes or marketing. The drive for more equitable economic and social governance frameworks extends to the younger generation with their concern for redressing past exploitative behaviour and what they consider ‘historical injustices’. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals set targets for moving towards more sustainable management of the planet and its resources which has set in motion global, EU and state action. Developments in digital technologies provide the tools enabling such action. For example, ICT enabled mapping and management of global resources means that there is hardly a spot on earth that cannot be assessed and made accessible through sophisticated earth observation systems, including orbit, deep sea, or areas below the ice. The internet, including big data and satellite technology, leads to abundant knowledge. In theory, everyone on earth could access the nearly endless source of knowledge and information. In this context, open-source and open technologies are trends that drive the establishment of global commons. However, as technology allows access to previously non-accessible spaces like the deep sea, space or areas covered by ice, the pressure on raw materials increases. The scarcity of certain materials leads to intensified research for new materials with new characteristics and for a more circular economy, recycling and energy technology. The abundance of resources is an equally important question which needs to be addressed since it can lead to (over-) exploitation of resources which are perceived as abundant. The main barriers relate to the fact that the global governance system is becoming weaker in the face of growing conflicts and crises, as states become more concerned with protecting their interests. A potential barrier in this respect is the growing resurgence of national sovereignty, extending to economic and technological sovereignty, and the related drive to secure critical resources. The rise of new global powers with different world-views and value-systems adds to the complexity together with the growth and (geographical) expansion of global markets (powered by digital advances and competition) and their behaviour in the absence of an effective governance framework and regulation. In the worst scenario, global markets dominated by unethical players can generate unfair and destructive economic behaviour. If unchecked such behaviour can lead to exploitative practices which can set dangerous precedents. While ongoing advances in information and communication technology enhance transparency in global market operations and provide more effective tools for improving governance particularly in the movement of money, however, the spread of virtual currencies and threats to cyber security, highlight the challenges faced in developing a frame of governance which ensures fairness and equitable trading. Whether countries will renew efforts to participate meaningfully in international governance systems – the ‘rules-based order’ – or whether they will continue to shift focus to more unilateral action (UK POST study). The extent to which governments will coordinate to direct and regulate the operations of international corporations. Futures What if knowledge, space, the sun, the sea, energy, oil, lithium, uranium, vaccines, microbes etc., became recognised as “global commons”? How will property rights be affected? What would science look like in an “open source” and “open knowledge” base? What if there is “fair” access to resources (for countries, social groups) and younger generations can influence global governance? What if there will be a return to multilateralism as a global governance principle (a multipolar world without stand-off between the big beasts)?

1 Why Multi-Level Context Scenarios? What types of EU R&I policies would be effective in the years to come? How shall these policies help us explore and respond to the uncertainties of the future? Finding answers to these questions requires first of all imagining the context, in which future EU R&I policies might be situated. For doing this, we need to explore developments both at global level and within the European Union. Several recent developments strongly suggest that a new ‘world order’ is evolving, replacing the relatively short period characterised by US dominance, which, in turn, followed the bipolar world (the cold war between the blocs led by the US and the USSR) that existed for several decades after WW2. This new world order will be a multipolar one, but we cannot know yet how these ‘poles’ would behave. Thus, it is an imperative to consider several options. To do so, we propose exploring three different types of multipolar worlds: A) ‘poles’ genuinely collaborating when tackling global challenges, B) antagonistic groups of countries that are nevertheless willing to engage in limited co-operation, and C) at least one ‘pole’ is openly hostile towards others.1 The EU might also evolve along different paths, and thus we have enriched these multipolar scenarios at global level by also exploring two variants of how the EU might evolve in each of the global scenarios. The two variants of EU development we consider are i) a dynamic and resilient variant and ii) a destabilised and thus vulnerable variant. Preferably, the EU will be strong, dynamic and resilient, but we cannot be sure about this, and thus need to consider a possible weakening of the EU’s position in the world. By considering these two futures for the EU in each of the three global multipolar scenarios, we arrive at a set of six scenarios in total (Table 1). Due to the explicit consideration of multiple development paths at both the global and EU levels, we obtain a multi-level architecture of scenarios. It is certainly more demanding to analyse the six possible futures stemming from our 2x3 structure, but it provides more nuanced insights on the possible contexts for the EU R&I policies, and thus these policies can be underpinned by more relevant analyses, considering several options in a systematic and transparent way. This multi-level nature is what distinguishes our set of scenarios from other recent scenario projects that we have drawn upon as sources of inspiration. The notion of a multi-track scenario, coined by the recent OECD project on Global Scenarios 2035,2 stresses the idea of rather autonomous developments paths of different clusters (groups) of countries. This idea is shared by the EC SAFIRE scenarios,3 which also propose almost autonomous future pathways of different world regions. The global dimension of our scenario matrix further differentiates the multi-track idea into three variants of how groups of countries might relate to each other: genuine collaboration, limited co-operation, or open hostility.4 The JRC’s background report to the EC Strategic Foresight Report 20215 with its emphasis on the concept of open strategic autonomy of the EU emphasises the relationship between the EU and its global context, but it does not distinguish multiple development pathways at both global and EU levels. We argue, however, that this distinction is particularly productive to explore options for future EU R&I policies, because the room – and need – for manoeuvre depends on global opportunities and constraints, as well as on the collaboration and disparities between the national innovation systems of EU Member States. Of course, other factors of relevance to EU R&I policies also influence the EU and the global landscapes, such as the emergence of new types of non-state actors, or growing concerns about global challenges that are shared by all countries. Considering several types of a multipolar world offers an opportunity to think about different types of political and policy stances vis-à-vis Russia, China, and the US, which is important in order to derive future-proof implications and devise a future-proof EU R&I policy strategy. For example, the EU can make cognisant, well-considered preparations for a hostile, as well as a limited or genuinely collaborative relationship with Russia in the coming decades. While the latter may seem difficult to imagine in Spring 2022, it should not be discarded in the longer term. Further, this structure makes it easier to recognise that we need to put more emphasis on the security of the EU, and thus its cohesion. It also implies the need of taking a more pronounced ethical stance by the EU when considering various options, actual and potential internal tensions, as well as external threats and challenges. In view of how the global relations might evolve in the three different world orders, the EU needs to take a position that is both robust with regard to these three possible future worlds and at the same time compatible with the basic values that the EU aspires to defend. These choices are likely to have crucial repercussions on its R&I policies as well. 2 Scenario Descriptions 2.1 Major common features of the three multipolar worlds and general observations The world is running on multiple separate tracks in all the three multipolar worlds, while the level of co-operation and conflict between the poles varies in the different scenarios. Attitudes towards key determinants of well-being (inequality, freedom of expression, surveillance, ...) are highly divergent between the groups of countries, of which the various poles are composed. Thus, social tensions and inequalities might be high in one ‘pole’, while in another one a socially balanced development is of high priority. That would possibly lead to mass migration from one pole to another (unless prevented by force). Planetary boundaries – especially biodiversity, climate change, quality of soil, air, and water – might be either neglected or respected in the different ‘poles’, possibly causing major global challenges – or even disasters – with their further economic, social, and environmental repercussions. These major issues are tackled in markedly different ways in the three types of multipolar worlds, just as access to critical resources. State actors, businesses, NGOs, and newly emerging actors might behave in different ways in the same scenario. Competition and collaboration might occur in parallel (both among and inside the ‘poles’, as well as among the different types of actors). Co-operation in research, technological development and innovation activities (attitudes towards collaboration, as well as its domains, channels and forms, the types of actors engaged) are likely to vary across the scenario sketches. Finally, the actual ways, in which the EU tackles the major challenges and disruptions could vary in the six scenarios, depending on to what extent the various major actors (the EP, the Council, the Commission, big businesses, NGOs, ...) can shape the agenda and control the actions needed to implement the decisions. All these aspects are to be explored during the more detailed scenario building phase of the project. 2.2 A genuinely collaborative multipolar world Given the emerging global challenges, there are strong and successful efforts to set up global governance mechanisms to tackle critical issues (climate, biodiversity, migration, access to energy and other natural resources, regional conflicts, ...). Sustainable development goals (SDGs) are at the top of the agenda. Planetary boundaries are major concerns for all major stakeholders in all (most) poles. Businesses are active partners in global trade, investment, and innovation activities across the poles. A) Thriving in collaboration: A strong, dynamic EU in a genuinely collaborative multipolar world The EU is politically and financially strong enough to tackle the major societal and environmental challenges in its own territory with innovative solutions, supported by effective R&I policies, orchestrated between the EU and member states’ levels, as well as across the relevant policy domains. These strengths and successes make the EU a leading partner – able to co-shape the agenda – in global collaborations, which, in turn, also creates favourable conditions to these efforts. D) Decline, despite collaboration: A destabilised EU in a genuinely collaborative multipolar world Given its decline, the EU can tackle only a few of the major societal and environmental challenges in its own territory. One of the root causes is the poor policy orchestration between the EU and member states’ levels, as well as across the relevant policy domains. The EU is a neglected partner in global collaborations and can take advantage of the favourable global framework conditions to a rather limited extent. 2.3 A multipolar world with limited co-operation Different systems and standards in different parts of the world have solidified, creating several parallel groups of states, which, however, ‘talk to each other’. Leading powers of the poles gradually recognise the need for international co- operation (e.g. given major disasters) in tackling the most urgent (and possibly less demanding) issues. Limited multilateral (global) governance mechanisms are in place to tackle these carefully selected critical issues. Success is achieved in tackling jointly some of these issues, lowering the probability of major conflicts. Some planetary boundaries are respected in most poles. Global trade, investment, and innovation activities across the poles occur, but to a rather limited extent. B) Respected partner: A strong, dynamic EU in a multipolar world with limited co- operation The EU is politically and financially strong enough to tackle the major societal and environmental challenges in its own territory with innovative solutions, supported by effective R&I policies, orchestrated between the EU and member states’ levels, as well as across the relevant policy domains. The outcomes of these efforts, however, are severely constrained by the limited nature of global collaboration. Given its strengths and successes, the EU is a respected partner in global co-operations. Yet, it is not strong enough to extend and intensify global co-operations due to the limited commitments of the other poles. E) Negligible partner: A destabilised EU in a multipolar world with limited co- operation Given its decline, the EU can tackle only a few of the major societal and environmental challenges in its own territory. One of the root causes is the poor policy orchestration between the EU and member states’ levels, as well as across the relevant policy domains. Further, the outcomes of the EU’s weak efforts are severely constrained by the limited nature of global co-operations. Given its weaknesses, the EU is neglected partner even in the limited global co-operations, cannot co-shape the agenda. 2.4) A hostile multipolar world At least 1-2 strong pole/s want/s to impose its values (ideologies), political, and socio-economic structures on other(s). The expansionist pole/s encourage/s their favoured firms to encroach into other pole/s to undermine that/ those. Antagonistic ideologies (political systems) first cripple global co-operation altogether. Simply it is impossible to tackle global critical issues. That triggers ever more severe major conflicts, leading to open hostility (cold and hybrid regional wars; the fatality of an all-out [nuclear] war is understood, though.) C) Deterring fortress: A strong, dynamic EU in a hostile multipolar world The EU is forced to focus on defence and security issues, at the expense of tackling major societal and environmental challenges in its own territory. Given its economic strengths, resources required for significantly improving its defence capabilities might be sufficient, especially if it can form alliances with other pole/s.6 F) Frail fiefdom: A weak, vulnerable EU in a hostile multipolar world The EU is forced to focus on defence and security issues, and thus largely neglects societal and environmental challenges. Given its poor economic performance, resources might not be sufficient even for significantly improving its defence capabilities. 3 The Added Value of Multi-level Context Scenarios Multi-level scenarios offer the possibility of capturing the complexity of contexts for policies in a systematic, structured, and thus transparent way. By definition, though, they are complex and more demanding than those that consider only a single governance level. Hence, multi-level scenarios are built and used far less frequently than single-level scenarios. Yet, for EU R&I policies both levels of contexts are of paramount importance: i) how global issues might unfold (what major issues, in need of global responses, would evolve and what types of global responses can be expected from various poles); and ii) in what EU context the EU R&I policies should be devised and implemented (especially the position of the EU vis-à-vis other major global players; the decision-making mechanism inside the EU, e.g. orchestration of policies across policy domains and governance levels; available resources for R&I policies). To start with the global level, the three multipolar world scenarios highlight that the global co-ordination mechanisms, including global markets, do not work satisfactorily for actors having a decisive power to shape political, economic, societal, and environmental developments, and thus they opt for following their own track. This basic feature is not a speculation; it is the reality to be faced by all actors. Only one of these scenarios depicts a world order, in which the poles are willing to collaborate when tackling global challenges, notably security and peace; access to energy, other critical resources, and food; environment (climate, soil, air, water, biodiversity), and migration, to mention just the most fundamental ones. These imply a strong need for effective orchestration of policies and other actors’ steps at the global level. Yet, in the other two multipolar worlds co-operation is either limited among the poles, or it is not only missing, but open hostility is the context. In a bit simplified way, we can claim that the EU had been created assuming the first type of world order: global co- ordination mechanisms, especially global markets work for all major actors in an acceptable way. Now it finds itself exposed to the realities of a multi-track world, at best with limited co-operation – but currently ‘tainted’ by open hostility as well, right at its Eastern borders. Depending on its own path, the EU can react to these new realities in different ways in the various multipolar scenarios. R&I activities must play a major role in finding relevant answers to these challenges, and thus R&I policies should deal with these issues. Just to illustrate it with the energy issue, in scenario A) the EU has access to energy sources globally. Further, it can collaborate with all major global actors in shaping and pursuing an energy R&I agenda7 at a relatively leisurely way and speed – and as a strong partner. Besides the global collaborative project, the EU can – and need to – still pursue its own energy R&I agenda. In scenario D) the EU can still collaborate on these issues with the other major partners, but given its weak position, would not be able to influence the agenda: it can only play a role decided by the major global players. In both cases the energy R&I agenda for collaboration would be mainly shaped by climate and economic considerations. Collaborations are likely to beneficial in either case, although to a significantly different extent, depending on the EU’s ability to shape the agenda. In scenario B) the EU ́s access to energy sources is more limited geographically. It can still co-operate with some major global actors in shaping and pursuing an energy R&I agenda, but the scope of these co-operations is narrower, and co- operation is less intense, compared to scenario A). In scenario E), the EU ́s role, and thus the benefits it can gain, are more limited than in scenarios B) and D). In scenarios B) and E) the energy R&I agenda would be mainly shaped also by climate and economic considerations. The weight of these factors would be defined by the nature of the limited co-operations, in which the global partners are willing to enter. A ‘variable geometry’ of co-operations is likely to emerge; different combinations of poles would agree on different types of co-operations (e.g., in terms of themes, intensity, and forms of co-operation) and these are likely to change over time. In scenario C), the EU has access to energy sources only in territory of those poles that are not hostile to it. It can only co-operate with its allies in this openly hostile world order. The scope and intensity of energy R&I co-operations would be determined by the nature and territorial aspects of hostility. Given its strengths, the EU can co-shape the co-operative energy R&I agenda with its allies. In scenario F), the EU ́s role, and thus the benefits it can gain, are more limited than in scenario C). In scenarios C) and F) the energy R&I agenda would be mainly shaped by security considerations, eclipsing climate and economic ones. Moreover, R&D results and the impacts of innovations would be requested more urgently by all stakeholders. That implies significantly stronger pressures on R&I actors than in scenarios A), B), D), and E), on the one hand, but also larger funds would be made available for these activities, on the other, at the expense of financing some other R&I activities. Although we have only hinted at some important implications of the energy issue given space limits, it needs to be stressed that the critical issues identified above are strongly interrelated. Just to illustrate the importance of their co-evolution – their impacts on each other –, let’s start again from the energy angle. The available energy sources (their types) and our way to use energy has major impacts on the environment (climate change, quality of soil, air, and water, as well as on biodiversity, e.g., insects pollinating plants), and thus on food security (quantity and quality of food supply). Security (geopolitical) issues would determine access to natural gas. As natural gas is a major input for fertilisers, there will be major implications for food security through this chain of impacts, too. Another example is that security (geopolitical) issues have direct impacts on food supply e.g., from Russia and Ukraine,8 and thus on food security in the EU and elsewhere. Climate change, security in its strict sense, and food security in other continents can easily trigger mass migration. Clearly, implications for R&I policies, stemming from these cross-impacts, need to be considered as well. More generally, the EU can use its R&I policies for science diplomacy in different ways and to different extent in the six scenarios sketched above. For example, in scenario A) it can initiate global R&I alliances for the pursuit of solutions to global problems (e.g., energy, climate, food security, new pandemics, digital safety and security). It can also promote global science as a ‘world public good’ and use its higher education systems to attract global talent to work in the EU or collaborate with EU partners upon return to their home countries. These opportunities would be significantly more limited in all the other scenarios (in terms of thematic and geographical scope, as well as intensity) given the EU’s own strengths, on the one hand, and the basic features of the world order, on the other. Further, the EU’s own interests would also differ significantly in the six scenarios, and thus it would – need to – put different emphasis on building its own strengths in isolation vs. seeking different types of co-operation. Considering multiple futures is a necessary precondition to devise ‘future-proof’ R&I policy strategies (including priorities, relevant policy tools, as well as governance structures and methods), that is, strategies that would be effective in most of the plausible futures. Our intention with this blog post is not to offer strategic advice, not even to identify a set of the most relevant and pressing strategic issues; rather, we would like to ignite a heated, but thorough, systematic, and transparent discussion on the possible future contexts for the EU R&I policies as a starting point for strategy setting, and thus invite the visitors – contributors – of this platform to consider the proposed set of scenarios, identify decisive issues that require close attention of decision-makers and consider the R&I policy implications of these issues. References and examples for multi-level scenarios Havas A. (2008): Devising futures for universities in a multi-level structure: a methodological experiment, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 75 (4): 558–582, https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.techfore.2008.02.001 OECD (2021): Global Scenarios 2035: Exploring Implications for the Future of Global Collaboration and the OECD, Paris: OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/df7ebc33-en Lebel L. (2006): Multi-level Scenarios for Exploring Alternative Futures for Upper Tributary Watersheds in Mainland Southeast Asia, Mountain Research and Development, 26 (3): 263–273, https://doi.org/10.1659/0276- 4741(2006)26[263:MSFEAF]2.0.CO;2 * All views presented in this site are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of national and EU bodies nor engage those in any manner. Footnotes: 1 The OECD considers just one type of multi-track world, composed of several “clusters” that is, groups – of countries, which follow their own track (path of development). These countries are not necessarily located in the same region, that is why they compose clusters, as opposed to world regions. 2 https://search.oecd.org/economy/global-scenarios-2035-df7ebc33-en.htm We use ‘multipolar’ and ‘multi-track’ scenarios as synonyms in this post. 3 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e436b4b6-fa50-11eb-b520-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-222702137 4 We could consider a fourth type of multipolar world, between limited co-operation and open hostility, when the “polars” – the various groups of countries – operate in a splendid isolation. In that world there is hardly any global trade, international co-operation in investment, and RTDI activities. There are no efforts to set up global governance mechanisms to tackle critical issues, and thus ‘luck’ is needed to avoid major conflicts. To keep the number of scenarios lower, however, we do not elaborate on those scenarios here. 5 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC125994 6 For a recent report on RTDI activities’ contribution to EU defence, see, e.g., https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_22_1045 7 The major objective would include to explore and extract new energy sources; develop new energy production (conversion) technologies and new ways to transport and store energy; enhance energy efficiency in all user sectors; better understand the behaviour and attitudes of various types of energy users, as well as the impact pathways of different policy tools, including regulations, to better steer and nudge their energy consumption patterns. 8 We can also think of other major food exporters in other countries and continents, depending on the food items in question.

Context Scenarios Workshop The online workshop on October 18–19, 2021, was the first in a series of interactive encounters involving foresight experts and practitioners from both EU services and the Member States. It focussed on exploring future dimensions and elements of contextual developments that may have important repercussions for EU R&I policies in general, and the 2nd Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe in particular. An overarching goal of the workshop, as well as the series of interactive meetings, was to provide initial impetus for a broad and in-depth discussion on the big picture and framework conditions for EU R&I policymaking. The first day was dedicated to discussing scenario elements (see Figure 1) developed in a multi-level structure and prepared by the project team based on a review of existing scenarios from different institutions[1]. The first dimension divides dynamics that relate to progress in the EU project into positive (dynamic, resilient) and negative (declining, destabilised, feeble), while the second dimension locates them on a global scale in peaceful, antagonistic, or limited collaborative relationships. The first task in the workshop focussed on enriching the presented scenario elements with additional STEEP factors on different levels (national, EU, global) and on identifying challenges and opportunities arising from the scenario elements for Europe. Furthermore, we discussed contextual factors that would matter most for EU R&I policies and potential changes of the respective actor’s landscape, as well as (new) actors that would be likely to take on significant roles when considering the identified challenges and opportunities. This in-depth discussion served to assess the disruptive potential of possible developments and to identify highly disruptive factors and factors with high uncertainty (see Figure 2). The second day of the workshop started with a voting activity: participants cast their votes for the disruption cluster with the highest future relevance. The selected clusters entailed “Moving beyond the tipping point of climate change”, “Global Relations”, “(Getting closer to) Technological Singularity”, “War”, and “European Relations”. The disruptions subsumed in one of the five selected clusters were once more assessed within smaller breakout groups. The most relevant disruptions formed the core of a “futures wheel” through which we explored potential impact of the disruption in different societal domains (global and European perspectives, industry and market, society/communities/NGOs, education, research, innovation, first responders, media, health, values, and others, e.g., law and order) and over three different time horizons (0-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years). At the end of the exercise, the factors that would drive the disruption under study were identified. The overall results of the workshop were summarised and condensed into a series of future narratives that present the different visions and developments as well as their disruptive potential and implications for society and especially for EU R&I policy making. You will be able to read through and comment on the developed future narratives in the upcoming weeks here! We ask you for a little patience and in the meantime look forward to your ideas and discussing them further with you! Lastly, click on the image below to explore the full Workshop Canvas: Enjoy! Your Project Team from Futures4Europe.org [1] E.g., the OECD (2021) Global Scenarios 2035, the JRC (2021) Scenarios on the global standing of the EU in 2040, the EEA (2020/21) Context and Solution Scenarios for a sustainable Europe in 2050 (unpublished), the EC (2021) Scenarios for Europe in the post Covid-19 world (unpublished), the EC (2021) SAFIRE Scenarios, the EC (2021) Perspectives on the future of open science Scenarios, the H2020 (2021) TRIGGER Scenarios for Global Governance, the H2020 (2021) NewHoRRIzon Environmental Scenarios 2038, EUA (2021) Pathways to the future Scenarios, or the RAND (2021) Future Scenarios to 2040 for the Research Council of Norway. All views presented in this site are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of national and European Institutions nor engage those in any manner.

After its hydrogen strategy in 2020[i], the EU has recognized hydrogen as a key technology for achieving policy goals such as the European Green Deal. Its strategy is heavily focused on emissions-free green hydrogen, with a target to install 40 gigawatts of renewable hydrogen electrolyser capacity by 2030.[ii] How Europe is positioned against other global players in the race on hydrogen? In 2019, around 120 million tonnes of hydrogen were produced globally, two-thirds of which is pure hydrogen and one-third of which is a mixture with other gases. China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of hydrogen, followed by the US and India (Figure 1). Figure 1. Hydrogen consumption in 2020 (million tonnes per year) Source: IRENA[iii] Note: Values are derived from the production of ammonia, methanol, refining and direct reduced iron for steel. Production costs vary from less than €2 to €14/kg for green hydrogen. The low end of these ranges can be achieved most easily in locations with access to low-cost renewable energy plants. Importantly, hydrogen production costs are estimated to decrease by around 50% through 2030, and then continue to fall steadily at a slightly slower rate until 2050. By 2050, green hydrogen production costs in some parts of the Middle East, Africa, Russia, China, the US and Australia will be in the range of €1 to €1.5/kg.[iv] Motivated by such projections, a growing number of countries and companies are engaged in intense competition for leadership in clean hydrogen technologies. Motivated by such projections, a growing number of countries and companies are engaged in intense competition for leadership in clean hydrogen technologies. In 2017, just one country (Japan) had a national hydrogen strategy. Today, around 45 countries are devising or have published hydrogen strategies, and several agreements have been concluded between countries to set up tomorrow’s trade routes for hydrogen (Figure 2). Furthermore, countries without specific hydrogen strategies are including hydrogen as part of their decarbonisation policies. Despite these efforts, we are still far from a world where green hydrogen plays a key role as a source of energy, given that demand for green hydrogen is limited and the infrastructure for green hydrogen is confined to industrial areas. Moreover, global electrolyser capacity amounts to just a few hundred megawatts, which lies significantly below the target of 115 GW by 2030 to meet the GH2 demands for all the published and announced strategies, and again far below the forecasted target of 5 TW by 2050, according to IRENA’s World Energy Transitions Outlook.[v] Figure 2. Green hydrogen strategies around the world. Source: WEF[vi] China In March 2022, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in China released a hydrogen energy industry planning document for the period 2021-2035[vii]; instead of a focus on subsidising the purchase of fuel cell vehicles (FCV), the policy will focus on developing China’s FCV sector in four key areas: Achieving breakthroughs in core technologies and key components along the FCV value chain Carrying out demonstration projects promoting the use of fuel cells in medium and heavy-duty commercial vehicles Reducing costs and creating economies of scale across the FCV value chain from hydrogen production through to distribution Improving the policy and institutional environment to support the adoption of fuel cell vehicles across the whole value chain from capability in core technologies through to construction and operation of refuelling stations. China consumes and produces more hydrogen than any other country – its current annual usage is more than 24 million tonnes. Most of the country’s production is “grey” hydrogen using fossil fuels, but more than 30 projects involving “green” hydrogen – created using emissions-free renewable energy – have been set up since 2019. China issued its first hydrogen roadmap in 2016, leading to it having the world’s third-largest fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV) fleet and to the country becoming a pioneer in developing fuel cell trucks and buses. China’s five-year economic plan recognizes hydrogen as one of the six industries of the future. Hydrogen features also in 16 provincial and city energy strategies.[viii] United States The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) released its (research-focused) Hydrogen Program Plan in late 2020 and has been tasked to prepare a national strategy and roadmap to facilitate a clean hydrogen economy.[ix] The plan describes the overarching, cross-office framework for its hydrogen research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) activities and provides an overview of core technology areas, challenges, and R&D priorities that the US DOE is pursuing in hydrogen technologies development. When the government passed into law the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, it contained a $9.5 billion budget to boost clean hydrogen development. This was followed by the launch of the government’s Hydrogen Earthshot programme, with its so-called “111 goals” to cut the cost of clean hydrogen to $1 per 1 kilogramme in 1 decade. Furthermore, the DOE's USD8 billion programme to develop regional clean hydrogen hubs - H2Hubs will create networks of hydrogen producers, consumers, and local connective infrastructure to accelerate the use of hydrogen as a clean energy carrier over five years. The US is the world’s second-biggest producer and consumer of hydrogen after China, accounting for 13% of global demand. US annual hydrogen production is currently about 10 million metric tonnes.[x] States such as California supported the country’s FCEV market growth for more than a decade with initiatives like the Clean Vehicle Rebate Programme. California published 2018 their vision of the Californian fuel cell revolution with an emphasis on mobility applications with key milestones including in 2025 – 200 refuelling stations, and 2030 – 1,000 stations, and 1,000,000 vehicles.[xi] India In February 2022, the Ministry of Power released a Notice regarding Green Hydrogen Policy. The Notice contains 13 points aimed at supporting India to meet its climate goals and making India a green hydrogen hub; such points include the waiver of inter-state transmission charges for a period of 25 years to the producer of green hydrogen and green ammonia from projects commissioned before 30 June 2025. The Notice also proposes the establishment of manufacturing zones for green hydrogen/green ammonia production plants. Media reports also noted that in a statement at the time of release of the Notice, the Ministry of Power noted that the initiatives included in the Notice would help in meeting the target of 5 million tonnes of green hydrogen production by 2030.[xii] Policymakers are considering legislation requiring oil refineries and fertilizer plants to use a minimum quota of green hydrogen in their industrial processes. Green hydrogen could be a huge value-adding opportunity for India as it pivots towards renewables and away from imported fossil fuels.[xiii] Japan In 2017, Japan became the first country to formulate a national hydrogen strategy as part of its ambition to become the world’s first “hydrogen society” by adopting the fuel across all sectors. In December 2020, METI released Japan’s ‘Green Growth Strategy Through Achieving Carbon Neutrality by 2050’, which includes five cross-sectional policy tools (or support measures) and action plans for 14 sectors. Decarbonisation of both the electricity and non-electricity sectors includes the widespread use of hydrogen (and derivative) energy.[xiv] The country lacks the natural resources needed to deploy sufficient levels of wind or solar to generate clean hydrogen at scale, so it is developing long-term supply agreements to import hydrogen from overseas. Alongside government investment in hydrogen and fuel cell technologies – totalling $670 million in 2020 – policymakers have set mobility targets of 800,000 FCEVs and 900 hydrogen refuelling stations by 2030.[xv] South Korea South Korea’s 2019 hydrogen roadmap hailed clean hydrogen as a key driver of economic growth and job creation. The nation has its sights set on becoming a global leader in producing and deploying FCEVs and large-scale stationary fuel cells for hydrogen power generation. Its Green New Deal contains an ambitious target of deploying 200,000 FCEVs by 2025 – about 20 times more than in 2020. And last year, South Korea passed the Economic Promotion and Safety Control of Hydrogen Act, the world’s first law aimed at promoting hydrogen vehicles, charging stations and fuel cells. Plans are in place for hydrogen to provide 10% of the energy needs of its cities, counties and towns by 2030, with its share rising to 30% by 2040 before it becomes the country’s largest single energy carrier by mid-century.[xvi] Other countries Net energy importers like Chile, in South America, and African countries such as Morocco and Namibia are emerging as exporters of emissions-free green hydrogen. Meanwhile, fossil fuel exporters like Australia, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are looking to clean hydrogen to help diversify their economies.[xvii] Please, comment and get engaged Please, comment the article or just add about other hydrogen developments around the world. Are global efforts piling up finally to create the needed momentum for materialising intriguing visions on a hydrogen economy? This article is part of the Deep Dive project 'The Hydrogen Economy: a radical Alternative. Register in the platform and get in engaged! [i] https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/hydrogen_strategy.pdf [ii] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/02/clean-hydrogen-energy-low-carbon-superpowers/ [iii] https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [iv] https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/energy-utilities-resources/future-energy/green-hydrogen-cost.html , https://h2v.eu/analysis/statistics/financing/hydrogen-cost-and-sales-prices [v] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [vi] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ [vii] https://research.csiro.au/hyresource/policy/international/ [viii]https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [ix] https://research.csiro.au/hyresource/policy/international/ [x] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [xi] https://research.csiro.au/hyresource/policy/international/united-states-california/ [xii] https://research.csiro.au/hyresource/policy/international/india/ [xiii]https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [xiv] https://research.csiro.au/hyresource/policy/international/japan/ [xv] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [xvi] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook [xvii]https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/green-hydrogen-climate-change-energy/ , https://irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook

Nobody wants to die early. The desire to stay healthy and to have a long-lasting life is enormous. At first glance, it seems as if the increasing number of older people in the EU is in accordance with that. When having a closer look at that trend, three main factors seem to contribute to an overall older population: a generally increased life expectancy, a modern, readily accessible medical system, healthier lifestyles, and low birth rates. Migration is a counter-trend to the ageing society, as the majority of migrants to the EU are young families. This fact, however, does not substantially diminish the absolute number of older people in the EU. The potential consequences are diverse. Although people get older while being healthier, it is likely that the cost of health care will rise, putting an extra burden on the health insurance system. Hence, we might have to expect a clear social divide: Will only rich people be able to afford to get old? Or are the additional health-related costs going to be shifted to younger generations? Will the state have to step in? Such a development might be fostered by the increased cost of health treatment itself. High-tech medicine requires high investments by hospitals. At the same time, the ongoing trend of economisation and commercialisation of the health care system elevates the pressure to be profitable. A continuous growth in health-related costs is the result. Unsurprisingly, not all patients will be able to cover those expenses. What now? Will there be a multi-class health care system in the EU? Do we have to give more power and ownership to the state? This would be a reversal of the currently predominant privatisation practice. In our modern times, so-called biohacking is growing in popularity. Biohacking is a form of self-optimisation based on making lifestyle changes, using nutritional supplements and undergoing certain medical treatments, with fresh-cell therapy being one of them. All those means require access to wealth, which strongly correlates with education. On a basic level, leading a healthy lifestyle is easily applicable. Methods of high-tech-optimisation, in contrast, are only accessible to wealthier members of society. In the context of an ageing society, we find a public debate on postponing the retirement age. It is to be expected that older people will be healthier and therefore able to contribute more to the pension and health care system for a longer period of time. This potentially will provoke a debate on equity and justice. In the light of the above-mentioned social divide caused by economic welfare, this felt injustice might foster the social divide. Europe is quite heterogeneous in terms of social inclusion. While in several countries older people mainly live in retirement homes, in other countries it is somewhat normal for them to be taken care of by their families. Older people are less open to novelties in digitalisation regardless of those living circumstances. There is a growing discrepancy between an increasing number of older people not being reached by recent digital innovations and the advance of fully digitalised procedures into numerous aspects of everyday life. This development has a double effect: first, the market for new digital solutions is limited. Secondly, older people progressively get disconnected or at least overwhelmed by digital modernisations. This causes quite a lot of them to reject digital means altogether, which then reinforces their marginalisation even stronger. A possible side effect of this digital marginalisation is the loss of trust in health guidance, leading to lower recovery rates from illness. From an evolutionary perspective, one could argue that, despite the potential of people getting older, the unbalanced access to modern means of health care will counteract the ageing of our society. This raises the question of what ethical standards to apply. Do we want a Europe that has economised ethics? There might be an increasing tension between social inclusion and the digital, as well as the economic divide between the young and the old. Digitalisation and privatisation are likely to add to the marginalisation of a growing group of European citizens and, therefore, the fragmentation of society. Hence, a central question must be how to make an ageing population keep up with a vast and fast societal modernisation. How do you want to get old? Would it be enough that Research and Innovation care for the needs of an ageing society? What about digitalisation's indirect effects on an ageing society in all aspects of life? A note to the article This small article is derived from a Qualitative Model which has been build on the basis of the Horizon Europe Strategic Plan 2021 -2024. While the topic ageing society is not new and many studies and knowledge exist, it is remarkable that a topic like an ageing society has cross connections across the whole Strategic Plan. Not always, this has been obvious. What do you think? Is this aspect of demographic change adequately reflected in today's R&I policy? Look into the model Click on the picture to navigate through the model. The model is rather complex, and you might easily lose the overview. Please check the "iMODELERCheatSheet" if you don't know how to navigate any more. Short description of the model This model represents the logic of argumentation and the underlying assumptions of the Horizon Europe Strategic Plan 2021 -2024. The Modell is both built upon the 6 Thematic Clusters and the KSOs. Central for this kind of assessment are the “Expected Impacts” that have been compiled by the European Commission and the Member Countries. These Expected Impacts are "collected" by the clusters on one hand and on the other hand-tied to the so-called "Impact Areas" that are connected to the KSOs. Hence, the Model can be assessed towards the Clusters or the KSOs. The model is large and strongly interconnected. Therefore, a good first step is to access the model based on the presenter, in which you can find preselected views and assessments of the model. The presenter-mode in the Model is targeted towards the above-shown article In case you have further questions please contact: ullrich.lorenz@4strat.de